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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

CRAIG J. REECE,
Appellant,
-vCase No. 1960 0
BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE STATE
OF UTAH, and the UNIVERSITY OF
UTAH,
Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant brought this action for declaratory
judgment challenging the constitutionality of policies and
procedures of increasing and utilizing rent at university of
Utah married student housing.

Appellant asserts that said

policies violate due process and equal protection under the
law.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BELOW
The Honorable James S. Sawaya of the Third judicial
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, Utah, denied
appellant's motion for partial summary judgment and granted
respondent Board of Regents1 motion to dismiss and respondent
University of Utah's motion for summary judgment.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

FACTS
On May 4, 1983, Craig J. Reece served a summons and
complaint upon the Board of Regents of the State of Utah and
the University of Utah.

(R. 2). Mr. Reece is a law student at

the University of Utah acting as plaintiff pro se in this
matter.

Mr. Reece and his family are residents of University

married student housing, known as the village (hereinafter
Village) and are subject to a rental agreement dated August 3,
1981.

(R. 2). The village is a housing project provided by

the University of Utah as a service to married students and
their families.

The rental agreement provides for a

month-to-month tenancy.

(R. 273). Married students are not

required to live in this housing.

Mr. Reece and his family

have voluntarily elected to live in the Village.
The Board of Regents of the State of Utah has the
authority to delegate powers to institutions of higher learning
as long as that delegation is not inconsistent with state law.
Utah Code Ann. § 53-48-2(2).

Pursuant to this authority, the

Board of Regents granted to the University of Utah the power to
approve housing charges to students, unless the particular
student housing is not self-supporting.

(R. 279). Hence, to

continue as a self-supporting (for definition of selfsupporting, see R. 2 79), housing system, the University of Utah
and the Village must raise student rent occasionally to meet
operation, maintenance and utility increases and also to
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maintain bond debt reserves. This concept is incorporated into
the rental agreement which states that rental rates may be
changed.

(R. 273). The rental agreement specifically states

that utility costs may be increased due to increased
consumption or higher utility rates by suppliers.

(R. 273).

From August 3/ 1981, until the filing of the
complaint on May 4, 19 83, the university of Utah raised the
rent on appellant's apartment from $244.00 per month to $302.00
per month.

(R. 8/3 3).

Each time the rent was increased, Mr.

Reece was given prior notice and an opportunity to respond. (R.
12 3, 2 69).

An increase of $58.00 over two years was necessary

to cover inflationary costs of operation, maintenance and
utilities.

The rents collected are deposited in the System

Revenue Account.

(R. 117). This account is part of the larger

bond system, called the University of Utah Student Housing
System Revenue Bonds.

(R. 117). This bond system was used for

the construction of the village and certain other buildings at
the University of Utah.

(R. 117). (A full explanation of the

University of Utah Student Housing Revenue Bonds will accompany
Point 11 of the Argument).
Appellant's complaint alleges that the University of
Utah and the Board of Regents each violated his rights of due
process and equal protection by establishing policies,
practices and procedures in increasing and spending rent which
were contrary to statutorily and constitutional law.
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-3-

He also

specifically challenged the construction of a new maintenance
building located near the Village.
Appellant moved for partial summary judgment
concerning the legality of the new maintenance building,
25).

(R.

Hearing on that motion was scheduled for July 11, 1983.

Respondent University of Utah's counsel rescheduled the hearing
for August 1, 19 83, and twice gave notice to Appellant of the
change.

(R. 98-99).

Appellant instead appeared at the July 11

hearing and gave no indication that he knew the hearing had
been rescheduled.

Judge Sawaya preliminarily granted

Appellant's motion for partial summary judgment but did not
sign the order.

(R. 111). Instead he afforded the respondents

an opportunity to explain their absence.

Respondents

subsequently did explain their absence (R. 98-104) and filed a
motion to have appellant held in contempt.

(R. 95).

The Board of Regents filed a motion to dismiss on
July 20, 1983, (R. 112), and the University of Utah filed a
motion for summary judgment on July 21, 198 3.

(R. 114). On

July 2 2, 19 83, Appellant's motion for partial summary judgment,
the Board of Regents' motion to dismiss and the University of
Utah's motion for summary judgment were rescheduled and set for
hearing on August 8, 198 3.

On August 2, 1983, Appellant filed

and mailed to the respondents requests for admissions and
requests for production of documents.

He did not make a motion

for continuance pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil procedure 56(f).
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After hearing oral argument on August 8, 19 83, judge
Sawaya signed an order on August 15, 1983, denying Appellant's
motion for partial summary judgment and granting respondent
Board of Regents1 motion to dismiss and respondent University
of Utah's motion for summary judgment.

(R. 3 29).

After this disposition, Appellant, on September 16,
1983, peculiarly submitted another motion for partial summary
judgment and a motion to compel production of documents.
334).

(R.

The respondents believed all issues were decided by

judge Sawaya in his August 15 ruling.

(R. 385). Counsel for

respondents prepared an order and in a hearing on October 3,
198 3, Judge Sawaya signed the order granting summary judgment
and dismissal.

This judgment was entered on October 7, 19 83.

(R. 368). Appellant subsequently filed an appeal to this Court
on October 31, 1983.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COMPLAINT AGAINST THE BOARD OF REGENTS
WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED BECAUSE THE BOARD OF
REGENTS VALIDLY DELEGATED THE AUTHORITY TO
SET RENTS TO THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH.
The Higher Education Act of 19 69, Utah Code Ann.
§§ 53-48-1, et seq. (1981 and Supp. 1983) established a system
of higher education which centralized the administration of
higher education in the Board of Regents of the State of Utah.
The purpose of that Act was to provide a more efficient and
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economical system of high quality public higher education by
adopting rules and regulations applicable to all institutions,
and by delegating certain powers to the institutions
themselves.
(1) It is the purpose of this act to
afford the people of the state of Utah a
more efficient and more economical system
of higher quality public higher education
through centralized direction and master
planning providing for avoidance of
unnecessary duplication within the "system,
for the systematic and orderly development
of facilities and quality programs, for
co-ordination and consolidation, and for
systematic development of the role or roles
of each institution within the system of
higher education consistent with the
historical heritage and tradition of each
institution.
(2) The purpose of this act is to vest
in a single board, the state board of
regents, the power to govern the state
system of higher education consistent with
the policies adopted under section 53-2-12
and in its discretion to delegate certain
powers to institutional councils.
Utah Code Ann. § 53-48-2 (1981) (emphasis added).
The Legislature recognized the burden which would be
placed upon the Board of Regents if it had to perform every
aspect of management and control of the various institutions.
Thus, the Legislature granted the Board discretion as to which
responsibilities to delegate.
supra.

Utah Code Ann. § 53-48-2(2),

There were certain responsibilities which the Board

determined the institutions were more capable of handling.
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The Board of Regents has the statutory authority to
arrange its own fiscal affairs.
There is hereby created and constituted a
state board of regents, which board is
empowered to sue and be sued and to
contract and be contracted with. The state
board of regents is vested with the control
management and supervision of the following
institutions of higher education in a
manner consistent with the policy and
purpose of this act and the specific powers
and responsibilities granted to it....
Utah Code Ann. § 53-48-4 (1981).
This provision speaks of supervision as well as
control.

Therefore, the Board of Regents can delegate certain

responsibilies (including financing) to the institutions.
These responsibilities are usually conditioned with guidelines
provided by the Board of Regents. Also, the Board of Regents
supervisory power allows it to oversee any operation when it
deems it necessary.

This concept has led to the adoption of

many policies currently utilized by the Board of Regents.
An important policy pertinent to the present action
is the Auxiliary Enterprise Policy, adopted by the Board of
Regents on April 2 2, 1975, and subsequently amended.

This

policy was reprinted in General policies of the Utah State
Board of Regents, 120-124 (published by the Office of the
Commissioner of Higher Education, Tterrence H. Bell,
Commissioner, 1976)•
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1.

Auxiliary Enterprises Shall Be
Conceptually Self-Supporting

This policy sets forth in broad terms
the requirements of the Board of Regents as
related to the operation of auxiliary
enterprises by Utah's institutions of
higher education. Inter-collegiate
athletic revenues and expenditures are
excepted from this policy since a separate
policy for those operations will be
considered at a later date.
Each member institution shall use this
policy for auxiliary enterprise units
operated on its campus. Substantial
departures from this policy must have prior
approval of the Board of Regents.
The criteria used to determine whether
or not a unit is considered an auxiliary
enterprise is based on the description
contained in College and University
Business Administration.
An auxiliary enterprise furnishes a
service to students, faculty and stafff
and charges a fee directly related to
but not necessarily equal to the cost
of the service. The public may be
served incidentally in some auxiliary
enterprises. Auxiliary enterprises are
essential elements in support of the
educational program, and conceptually,
should be regarded as self-supporting.
For the purpose of this policy,
auxiliary enterprise units, therefore,
include the followng unless otherwise
provided by the Board: (1) bookstore, (2)
food services, (3) housing, (4) student
union buildings, (5) vending machine
operations, (6) parking services, (7)
special events centers, (8) student health
services, (9) others that from time to time
meet the definition of an auxiliary
enterprise.

-8-
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Self-supporting i s defined as producing
s u f f i c i e n t revenue to cover applicable
d i r e c t operating c o s t s , allocated i n d i r e c t
expenses, changes for renewal and
replacement, debt service requirements,
working c a p i t a l needs including recovery of
losses.
Id.
This policy expressly includes housing as an
auxiliary enterprise.

I t also expressly gives the i n s t i t u t i o n s

of higher education the power to operate these a u x i l i a r y
enterprises.

The Board of Regents at i t s May, 1980 f meeting

c l a r i f i e d the policy requiring Board of Regents 1 review of food
and housing charges only when student housing i s not
self-supporting as defined by the Auxiliary Enterprise p o l i c y .
President Gardner suggested t h a t Board
policy be modified to require Board review
and approval of housing and food charges
only in the event t h a t student housing i s
not self-supporting from user charges.
Regent Newey offered a motion to request
the Commissioner to draft an amendment to
the Board's a u x i l i a r y policy to incorporate
President Gardner's recommendation. He
emphasized t h a t those i n s t i t u t i o n s that are
using other options as provided in the
housing addendum adopted by the Board today
should continue to submit t h e i r proposed
housing and food charges to the Board to .be
subject to i t s approval. Regent Brockbank
seconded and the motion was unanimously
adopted.
Minutes, Utah State Board of Regents, May, 1980.

(R. 278).

Under t h i s amendment, only housing p r o j e c t s not self-supporting
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r e q u i r e Board of Regents 1 r e v i e w . 1

The Board of Regents, in

line with i t s adopted policy, t r e a t s a l l student housing a t
i n s t i t u t i o n s of higher education in the State of Utah as
a u x i l i a r y e n t e r p r i s e s which must be s e l f - s u p p o r t i n g .

(R. 282).

Also, both the Board of Regents and the University of Utah have
examined the married student housing complex ( v i l l a g e ) and have
determined t h a t i t meets the d e f i n i t i o n of s e l f - s u p p o r t i n g .
(R. 282, 285).

Thus, no board of Regents review for r e n t

changes a t the v i l l a g e i s needed.
Appellant argues t h a t the c l a r i f i c a t i o n of policy
regarding rent changes a t the May 19 80 meeting was ineffective
under the Utah M m i n i s t r a t i v e Rule-Making Act, Utah Code Ann.
§§ 63-4 6-1 e t seq. (1953 a s amended).

However, the Board of

Regents and the University of Utah are exempt from the
requirements of the Administrative Rule-Making Act.

Utah Code

Ann. § 63-46-12 (195 3 as amended) s p e c i f i e s what steps must be
taken.
Notwithstanding any other provisions of
this act, all actions heretofore or
hereafter taken by the state board of
regents, the state board of vocational
education, the institutional council of any
institution of higher education, or by any
agency of internal governance of any

1 This amendment was subsequently entered into the
official policy in a compilation known as Mended policy for
Auxiliary Enterprises Operating Revenue and Expenditutes
effective July 1, 1982.

-10-
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institution in the system of higher
educationf to adopt, amend, or repeal any
rule shall be deemed to be in full
compliance with the provisions of this act
if all of the following requirements are
satisfied.
(1) The action was taken at a regular
meeting of or other hearing held by said
board, council, or agency of internal
governance that was open to the public and
at which all interested persons were
offered a reasonable opportunity to
participate by submitting data, views, or
argument either orally or in writing.
(2) Notice of the proposed action was
given by listing it in the official written
agenda for the meeting or hearing, and the
agenda was available for public inspection
at the office of the board, council or
agency not less than five days prior to the
meeting or hearing.
(3) The minutes and other records of
actions taken under this section, and a
copy of all rules currently in effect that
have been adopted by the board, council, or
agency, are maintained at its office and
are available to the state archivist and
open for inspection by any member of the
public during normal business hours.
Id.
The Board of Regents is well aware of the
requirements of this section and was in compliance at the
meeting in question.

Nowhere in the record has Appellant shown

one fact which would lead to the conclusion that the Board of
Regents did not follow Utah Code Ann. § 63-46-12.
The Board of Regents by statute may delegate certain
powers to the University of Utah and other institutions of

-11-
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higher education.

Utah Code Ann. § 53-48-2(2) (1981).

However, if there is a specific law forbidding it, the Board of
Regents can not delegate a particular power.

Appellant

suggests that this law exists in Utah Code Ann. § 53-38-1(4)
(1981).

This statute reads:
The state board of higher education is
authorized and empowerd on behalf of such
institutions: ... (4) to equip, furnish,
maintain and operate such projects and
buildings. For the use and availability of
the foregoing the board may impose and
collect rents, fees and charges from
students, faculty members, and other
persons, firms, and corporations, both
public and private. As used in this
chapter, "projects" and "buildings" include
any one or more of such facilities.

Id.
Nothing in this provision, however, requires the
Board of Regents to impose and collect rents.

The Board of

Regents is authorized and empowered to equip, furnish,
maintain, and operate buildings of such institutions.

However,

nothing here prevents the Board of Regents from delegating
duties to the institutions of higher education.

If the

institutions of higher education fulfill this function under
delegation from the Board of Regents, the Board of Regents is
not abdicating its power.

It is merely formulating a method of

arranging their (institutions) financial affairs.

It is

important to read this section in conjunction with the overall
purpose of the Higher Education Act of 19 69, Utah Code Ann.

-12-
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§ 53-48-2 (1981), and powers of the Board of Regents, Utah Code
Ann. § 53-48-4 (1981).

These sections indicate that delegation

is appropriate.
The Board of Regents is not required to set rents
because in the second sentence of § 53-38-1 above it states
that the Board of Regents "may impose and collect rents."

it

does not say the Board "shall" set rents, use of the term
"may," rather than the term "shall," makes procedures
permissive and not mandatory.

State ex rel. Cartwright v.

Oklahoma, 640 P.2d 1341 (Okla. 1982).

In discussing the term

"may" in a different statute, the Utah Supreme Court in Grant
v. Utah State Land Board, 485 P.2d 1035 (Utah 1971), stated:
Foundational rules require that each term
of a statute was used advisedly; and that
each should be given an interpretation and
application in accord with their usually
accepted meaning, unless the context
otherwise requires. In this connection it
must be realized that, although there are
exceptions where the context does fairly
require otherwise, the word "may" in its
most usual meaning does not import
certainty, but uncertainty. This is,
whatever is referred to, either may or may
not be, or occur. This line of reasoning
proceeds: that if the legislature had
intended an applicant to have an absolute
right of reinstatement, instead of saying
that an applicant "may have his contract
reinstated," it could easily have used the
word "shall" or "must," and thus have
rendered a mandatory meaning clear.
Id. at 1036-37.

-13-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Also, the Utah Supreme Court has used the principle
that statutes are not to be considered "mandatory" unless some
consequences are attached to the failure to act.
Transit Authority, 618 P.2d 48 Of 4 81 (Utah 1980).

Stahl v. Utah
Here no

penalty attaches for the failure of the Board of Regents to
collect rents. Appellant points to no other Utah statute which
requires the Board of Regents to establish and collect rent.
Appellant suggests that application of the cases of
First Equity Corp. v. Utah State University, 544 P.2d 8 87 (Utah
197 5), and Intermountain Health Care v. Industrial Commission,
657 P.2d 1289 (1982), would preclude the University from
setting rent.

However, the facts and conclusions in those

cases are actually contrary to appellant's argument.

Both of

those cases dealt with the question whether the Legislature had
delegated certain powers.

in Intermountain Health Care, the

court followed "the rule that the Legislature's delegation of
the power to set rates must be in clear, express, and
unmistakable terms."

Id. at 1291.

Even the appellant would

not argue that the power to set rents is still in the
Legislature.

Also, the minimal factual similarity between the

industrial Commission setting hospital rates and the university
establishing rental charges for student housing renders this
case inapplicable.

Also, appellant's hypothetical comparison

to the Public Service Commission's utility rate setting is
meritless.

utility rates affect every member of the
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Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

community in a specific area served,

people have no choice but

to pay increases approved by the Commission. Whereas,
Appellant certainly has a choice as to where he lives.
POINT II
THE UNIVERSITY HAS COMPLIED WITH ALL
ASPECTS OF THE BOND RESOLUTION AND HAS MADE
NO UNAUTHORIZED TRANSFERS.
The bond system which provides the funds for the
construction of University village and cetain other buildings
at the University of Utah is called the University of Utah
Student Housing System Revenue Bonds. Within this bond system
various accounts are established.

All revenues from the

operation of the housing system are deposited in the Systems
Revenue Account.

Bond Resolution § 4.02, (R. 183). This

account is maintained by the University and is used to pay
current expenses of the housing system.

Bond Resolution

§§ 4.03 and 4.04, (R. 184).
The funds remaining in the System Revenue Account
after the operating costs have been paid are deposited in the
System Net Revenue and Income Fund Account (SNRIFA).
Resolution § 4.05, (R. 18 4).

Bond

Funds are transferred from SNRIFA

to the System Bond Fund to ensure sufficent money to pay the
principal and interest payments on the bonds.
§ 4.0 7, (R. 185-188).

Bond Resolution

The account for these payments is called

the Debt Service Reserve.
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After a l l the required funds have been t r a n s f e r r e d
from SNRIFA to the Debt Service Reserve, the bond r e s o l u t i o n
r e q u i r e s t h a t $113,0 50 be t r a n s f e r r e d each f i s c a l year to the
System Repair and Replacement Reserve Account.
§ 4.08r (R. 188).

Bond Resolution

The t r a n s f e r does not take place if the

System Repair and Replacement Reserve Account has a surplus of
$2,263,500 o r more.

Bond Resolution § 4.08, (R. 188).

Any

funds remaining in SNRIFA a f t e r paying current expenses, and
t r a n s f e r r i n g r e q u i s i t e funds to the Debt Service Reserve and
the System Repair and Replacement Reserve Accounts may be used
(1) t o make advance payments on Student Housing System Revenue
Bonds, (2) to apply or accumulate a reserve for c o n s t r u c t i o n ,
furnishing, or acquiring a d d i t i o n a l or e x i s t i n g housing
f a c i l i t i e s or r e l a t e d a u x i l i a r y b u i l d i n g s , or (3) for any
lawful purpose.

Bond Resolution § 4.09/ (R. 189-190).

The funding for the construction of the new
maintenance building a t u n i v e r s i t y v i l l a g e came from SNRIFA
funds as authorized by § 4.0 9 of the Bond Resolution, (R. 220).
The construction of t h a t building w i l l f i t e i t h e r category (2)
or (3) of § 4.09 r (R. 189-190).

"Hie maintenance building

falls

within the d e f i n i t i o n of "improving, r e p l a c i n g , r e s t o r i n g , or
equipping any e x i s t i n g f a c i l i t i e s comprising the Housing
System."

Id.

This small maintenance building w i l l c e r t a i n l y

improve the maintenance and operation of the e x i s t i n g
University v i l l a g e .

-16-
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The operation of the bond system relating to funds
acquired through rent follows specific state law.

Utah Code

Ann. § 53-38-6 (1981) states:
[A]11 income and revenues derived from the
operation of the building shall be ...
applied solely to the payment of the
principal of and interest on the bonds, and
to the extent so provided in the resolution
authorizing the bonds, to the payment of
the cost of maintaining and operating the
building and the establishment of reserves
for such purposes....
Id.

This section specifically allows the establishment of

reserves and for the cost of maintaining and operating the
buildings if the bond resolution so authorizes.

There is

additional support in the Utah law, from the Utah Legislature
and from the Board of Regents for the improvement of the
Village.

Utah Code Ann. § 53-38-1*8 (1981) states:
The state board of regents, acting in its
capacity as the governing authority of the
University of Utah, is hereby authorized
[to] issue, sell, and deliver revenue bonds
of the University of Utah for the purpose
of paying the cost of improving and
renovating married student housing at
University village on the campus of the
University of Utah in Salt Lake City,
including the acquisition of all necessary
appurtenant furnishings and equipment....

Id.

This section clearly indicates authorization of both the

Legislature and the Board of Regents for the upgrading of
University Village.

Also, the bond system and issuance was

submitted and approved by the Utah State Auditor to assure
compliance with Utah law and proper accounting principles.
137-139).
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(R.

Further indications in the record support the
assertion that the Board of Regents has approved the building
of the maintenance building and other operating and maintenance
costs.

The Board has adopted a policy that it will review

expenditures for cosntruction only when funds must be
appropriated from the Legislature, when the authority to incur
bonded indebtedness is required, or when the expense is over a
certain amount.

(R. 241-242).

The policy requires an

expenditure for new construction at the University fo Utah to
exceed $1,00 0,00 0 before Board approval is required. (R. 24 2).
If the amount is less than $1,000,000, Board approval is
assumed.
The estimated cost of constructing the building was
$290,000; the final project cost was $360,817, well below the
$1,000,000 limit.

Thus, Board of Regents1 approval was assumed

and specification by the Board was not required.

The

University of Utah institutional Council, which has authority
to approve University of Utah expenditures, did approve the
construction of the maintenance building.

(R. 243).

In addition to the maintenance building, which the
University admits was constructed, Appellant states in
appellant's brief at p. 2 2 that he has identified five other
specific payments which were applied to accounts other than
legally allowed.
payments.

Appellant, in actuality, has identified no

None of these payments is supported by the record.
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The only payment actually in the record is a $ 69,340.0 0 payment
taken from the receipts of University Village and used to pay
the university of Utah for their general and administrative
expenses incurred for operating University Village.

(R. 22).

This money was not transferred to the general revenues or any
other account of the University of Utah.

(R. 221).

Appellant asserts that a tax on married student
housing is used to pay other University expenses.
simply not true.

This is

The only example used by appellant is the

administrative expenses of police and fire protection, and
personnel services provided to the village by the University of
Utah.

These are expenses every private landlord passes on to

tenants, and expenses which the village must pay as operation
and maintenance expenses. Appellant cites Utah Code Ann.
§ 53-38-6 as support for this assertion.

However, this section

clearly allows rent to pay for the cost of the operation and
maintenance of buildings.

It seems very clear that personnel

services, police and fire protection constitutes operation and
maintenance expenses. Appellant claims that by having to pay
for these services at the Village he is being treated
differently than other students not living at the Village.
However, the fact is that the other students that do not live
at the Village must pay for these types of costs at their own
domiciles through property taxes or rent.
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POINT III
THE UNIVERSITY HAS NOT VIOLATED ANY
REQUIRED PROCEDURES OR DUE PROCESS IN
ESTABLISHING RENTS AT THE UNIVERSITY
VILLAGE.
Appellant correctly cites State ex rel. Summers v.
Wulffenstein, 616 P.2d 608, 610 (Utah 1980); Goss v. Lopez, 419
U.S. 565, 576 (1976); and Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564, 569 (1972), for the proposition that for a due process
analysis to be made, some property interest must exist.
However, Appellant has no such interest.

The university of

Utah is under no duty to provide housing to married students.
It is not enforcing any federal or state housing statute, "The
range of interests of procedural due process are not infinite."
Board of Regents, supra at 570.
Various types of benefits under state and federal
statutes have been held to constitute "property" subject to due
process requirements.

In the cases of Aguiar v. Hawaii Housing

Authority, 522 P.2d 1255, 1267 (Ha. 1974); Thompson v.
Washington, 497 F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1973); and Burr v. New
Rochelle Housing Authority, 479 F.2d 1164 (2d. Cir. 1973), all
cited by appellant as supporting his cause, there was a federal
or state statute authorizing or requiring low-cost housing,
thus raising a property interest because the tenants had a
"claim of entitlement ... grounded in the statute."
Regents, surpa at 57 7.

Board of

In the present case, however, Appellant

has no claim of entitlement grounded in statute.
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Thus, Appellant is relegated to finding a property
interest grounded in the rental agreement itself.

(R. 273).

It is possible for due process property rights to emanate from
some contracts, express or implied.
U.S. 593, 599 (1972).

Perry v. Sinderman, 408

However, these are very limited cases.

Examples are cases where a person's good name, reputation,
honor and integrity is at stake. Wisconsin v. Constantineau,
400 U.S. 433, 437 (1970).

Appellant cannot claim that this is

a situation where his good name, reputation, honor, or
integrity is at stake.

Thus, procedural due process is not

required in this case.
Appellant's rental agreement indicates that he has a
month-to-month tenancy.

Tenancies from month-to-month are not

continuing rights of possession but end and recommence at the
expiration of every month.

Thompson v. Gin, in and for the

County of Pima, 566 P.2d 17 (Ariz. 1976); The Hour Publishing
Company v. Govez, 254 A.2d 919 (Conn. 1968).

It is clear that

rent increases appliying to future leases creates no property
interest.

Riger v. L. & B. Limited Partnership, 3 63 A.2d 4 81,

487 (1976). Further, future leases do not presently exist, and
it is impossible to have a property interest in something that
does not exist.

If Appellant does not appreciate his rent

being raised two months in the future under a new lease, his
alternative is to find more suitable and more economical
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housing in the private sectorf not to be afforded procedural
due process.
Even assuming for the purpose of argument that
Appellant does have a property interest which is protected by
due processf it is clear that the University has met due
process requirements.

It is now and always has been the policy

of the university to act with the utmost fairness in the
increasing of rent at the Village.
The arm of the University of Utah responsible for
approving financial arrangements of the University is the
institutional Council of the University of Utah.

The rents at

the Village are discussed at meetings of the Institutional
Council.

If the increase of rent charges is to be considered a

rule, the Administrative Rule-Making Actr Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46-12 (1953 as amended), must be followed.
for full text of statute).

(See pp. 10-11

These requirements are always met

by the institutional Council.

They approve rent changes at a

regular meeting open to the public.
comment on issues at these meetings.

The public is free to
Advance notice is given

and the minutes are available to the public in the offices of
the institutional Council.

A copy is also sent to the Board of

Regents to keep them apprised of developments.

(R. 264-26 5).

Thus, all the requirements of the Administrative Rule-Making
Act are met.

In addition, Appellant is represented on the

Institutional Council, by the student representative.

-22-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Again, assuming Appellant has a property interest, he
believes he personally has a right to notice and to comment on
the proposed increases. Whether he has a property interest or
not, he is afforded notice at least two months prior to the
time the proposed increase will take effect.

(R. 269). This

is in accord with paragraph 1(d) of the lease, (R. 269), and
further affords the tenants adequate time to respond.

Notice

of each proposed increase complained of here was delivered at
least 60 days prior to the rent increase.

(R. 271). Every

tenant of University Village is given an opportunity to respond
to an increase in rent by either telling his village
Representative, the Director of Student Family Housing, or by
appearing before the Instutitional Council of the University of
Utah.

(R. 2 71). Tenants are notified prior to the meeting of

the institutional Council in which it approves the rent
increase.

(R. 269f 266). Respondents are certainly creating no

special status by this process.

instead they are extending a

service to the tenants which no citizen residing in private
housing is afforded, and which easily fulfills due process
requirements.
This due process requirement of personal notice to
Appellant is more than is required by Utah law.

Setting rent

is undoubtedly an administrative matter, and notice for
administrative matters is more limited than in other areas of
the law. Worral v. Ogden City Fire Department, 616 P.2d 5 98,
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602-603 (1980).

In the Worral

decision, only two justices

could agree that when a public employee is discharged (an
administrative matter much more presonal in nature than setting
rent) the individual need be apprised of information
"reasonably calculated to afford the informant an opportunity
to be heard at a proper time and in a proper manner."
601-602.

Id. at

The present case is much different than Memphis

Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 13-16 (1978),
where the Supreme Court held that utility customers must be
apprised of the procedure to challenge a utility termination.
The Craft case, like Worral, supra, represents a much more
personal action.

In that case, the customers were given little

or no notice of the shut-off, and no opportunity to respond.
Here, the student resident is informed over 6 0 days prior to
the increase in rent.

Furthermore, by living at the village,

Appellant understands that he may respond to his Village
Representative or to the Director of Student Family Housing
about any problems with the housing.
POINT IV
JUDGE SAWAYA'S GRANTING OF DISMISSAL AND
SUMMARY JUDGMENT APPROPRIATELY ENDED
DISCOVERY.
A g r e a t d e a l of a p p e l l a n t ' s

a r g u m e n t i s b a s e d on

f a c t s which he a s s e r t s were a d m i t t e d b e c a u s e r e s p o n d e n t
t o respond

to h i s r e q u e s t for admissions.

(R.

297-307),
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failed

356-361).

On August 2, 1983, just six days prior to the

scheduling hearing, Appellant filed Requests for Admissions and
Request for production of Documents.

Respondents received

these requests near the end of that week and did not have time
to compile the information by the Monday, August 8/ 1983
hearing.

At the August 8/ 198 3 hearing, Counsel for

Respondent, university of Utah, Mr. William Evans asked judge
Sawaya if his order would take care of the outstanding
discovery requests.

(R. 386). Judge Sawaya acknowledged that

his order would cut off the discovery. (R. 386/ 388). In
accord with that, judge Sawaya signed his own written order on
August 15/ 198 3/ granting motions for summary judgment and
dismissal, and denied plaintiff's motion for partial summary
judgment.

(R. 329). When Judge Sawaya sent the parties copies

of his order, signed by him (a common practice in the District
Court) discovery ended.

Appellant does not dispute the fact

that a grant of summary judgment or dismissal ends discovery.
Appellant contends that Rule 2.9(a) of the Rules of
practice of the District and Circuits Courts requires a formal
typewritten order be prepared by the prevailing party
(Respondents in this case).

Counsel for Respondents did agree

to prepare this order and at a hearing on October 3/ 1983/
judge Sawaya agreed to sign the order.
signed this orderf including Appellant.

(R. 387). All parties
(R. 368). If
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Appellant believed the case was still pending, he should not
have signed this order.

Even Judge Sawaya was confused as to

why Appellant appeared before him on October 3f I9 83f after the
court had already granted the motions.

(R. 386). Judge Sawaya

could see no practical purpose in allowing further discovery
after the motion had been granted.

(R. 387).

Appellant cites several Utah cases and Utah Rule of
Civil Procedure 36(a) for his proposition that the failure to
get a signed typewritten order from the court within fifteen
days, extends discovery and thusf his request for admissions
are admitted based on Respondents1 failure to respond.
However, none of the cases cited by Appellant deal with the
fact situation surrounding Appellant's outstanding request for
admissions.
This is certainly unlike Schmitt v. Billings, 6 00
P.2d 516 (Utah 1979), where an outstanding request for
admissions was deemed admitted.

In that case, the time for

response to the request had passed before any hearing on a
motion to dismiss was scheduled.

This Court indicated that

even scheduling a hearing would have been sufficient to stop
the admissions from being deemed admitted.

Id. at 519.

In the case now before this court, not only was the
hearing scheduled, it was scheduled before the requests were
filed.

Further, the motions for dismissal and summary judgment

were granted and the judge signed a handwritten order to that
effect.
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This was also different than the "unsigned minute
entry" in Wilson v. Manning, 64 5 P.2d 65 5 (1982)/ which did not
constitute "an entry of judgment,"
The main issue in the cases which Appellant cites is
the issue of whether the particular case was ripe for appeal.
Wilson, supra at 656; Yusky v. Chief Consol. Mining Company,
236 P. 452 (Utah 1925); Bigelow v. Ingersol, 618 P.2d 50 (Utah
1980).

At most, the second order of October 3/ 1983/ perfected

this case for appeal.

By not answering plaintiff's request for

admissions, the defendants were merely following judge Sawaya's
signed order.
The Judge did not err in disallowing Appellant any
further discovery.

Besides rendering a judgment which cut off

discovery, the court had no motion before it to allow
continuance of discovery as required by Rule 5 6(f) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.

If Appellant wished his discovery

motions to be effective at the time of the summary judgment
hearing, he only needed to make a motion for continuance.

In

addition, Appellant filed his complaint over three months prior
to this time, and had sufficient time to conduct discovery.
The fact that he waited until six days prior to the hearing on
the motions for summary judgment and dismissal indicates he was
merely trying to delay the proceedings.
Appellant in his brief, p. 3 2/ states he filed a
motion for continuance.

However, there is no motion for

continuance as part of the record now before this court.
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Further, Appellant claims that Respondents had
exclusive possession of evidence.

Most of the records

requested by Appellant are public documents, available to
Appellant upon his request.
Apparently, judge Sawaya was satisfied that the
information and evidence before him clearly absolved the
University of Utah and the Board of Regents of any liability as
to matter of law.

Thus, allowing further discovery would have

been cumulative, and the granting of summary judgment and
dismissal was proper without more discovery.

Howell v.

Management Assistance, Inc., 519 F.Supp. 83 (D.N.Y. 1981).

CONCLUSION
The Board of Regents of the State of Utah has the
statutory power to delegate the authority to set rents to the
University of Utah and other institutions of higher learning.
The Board did not violate any provision of law when clarifying
this policy at its May, 1980, meeting.

The university of Utah

lawfully followed all necessary procedures in fixing rents, and
the University utilized the rent collected pursuant to the bond
resolution and state law.
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Thus, Respondents urge t h i s Court t o affirm t h e
d e c i s i o n of t h e H o n o r a b l e James S. Sawaya b e l o w .
Dated t h i s

^ 9 *A

d a y o f A p r i l , 19 8 4 .
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

f_
HJJL L. WALKER
BII
A s s i s t a n t Attorney General
Attorney for University of Utah

u &QLL~

m

DOUGLAS C. RICHARDS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Board of Regents
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